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Disinformation in the Marketplace of Ideas 
Tim Wu* 
It was just one line, nearly a throwaway; technically a subordinate 
clause.1  Yet that one clause from Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Abrams 
dissent breathed life into a metaphor, the “marketplace of ideas,” whose 
lasting power is undeniable.  Nor is it difficult to understand why.  Yes, 
it may be incomplete, inaccurate, and possibly cribbed from John Stuart 
Mill, but the metaphor matches something we all see.  Ideas and 
ideological programs are out there looking for adherents or “buyers.”  In 
Holmes’s time, progressives, socialists, and fascists courted supporters, 
just as similar groups do now.  Specific ideas like the flat tax or the 
legalization of marijuana seek their own buyers and usually go nowhere 
but may suddenly catch on, just as in the world of real products.  
I leave it to others to criticize the metaphor.2  What I want to 
suggest here is that it isn’t taken seriously enough.  Despite all the talk, 
the First Amendment offers incomplete protection for the marketplace 
of ideas.  If we were halfway serious about the premise that the 
marketplace of ideas needs protection by courts, we’d be interested in 
all the ways that government or private parties can distort or block 
competition.  But the First Amendment has no interest in most such 
distortions—especially those created by disinformation campaigns, 
which have rapidly become the speech control technique of choice in the 
early 21st century.  
If we were speaking of competition in a real market,3 no one would 
pretend that burdens on selling are the only means by which the market 
may be distorted or corrupted.  In reality, the figurative “marketplace of 
ideas” is lodged in the actual and less lofty markets for products of 
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 1 “[T]hat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market.”  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).   
 2 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1984); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–30 (1982). 
 3 Richard Posner, in the 1970s, argued that the marketplace of ideas is indeed an 
actual market.  See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 627–38 (3d ed. 1986).  
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communication and culture.4  As both antitrust and trade law teach, the 
means of distorting fair competition are myriad.  They include not only 
government bans on selling but also the actions of monopolies, 
subsidization, taxation, agreements to exclude rivals, and so on.  Courts 
like to say things like, “it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that 
the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”5  But 
the Court maintains an impoverished idea of what constitutes neutrality 
and what constitutes interference.6 
To be sure, the First Amendment does make it difficult for 
government to selectively ban some viewpoints altogether, which is 
significant.  But I believe that a determined government, with nothing 
standing in its way, can achieve much if not all of what it might want to 
achieve using disinformation campaigns as opposed to censorship.  In 
the same way that reward can substitute for punishment, or 
subsidization can substitute for taxation, government, using 
information itself, can achieve significant control over the national 
information environment.7 
What to do then?  The reader may be disappointed to learn that I 
do not actually think courts can fully protect the marketplace of ideas 
from means of control or distortion that depend on disinformation or 
other techniques.  Is it then such an enormous loophole, which makes 
the project of protecting a marketplace of ideas seem like a bad joke?  
No, but only because First Amendment scholars tend to ignore the fact 
that most of the protection of the marketplace of ideas from deliberate 
attack is done not by courts but by other institutions—information 
intermediaries, like the press, and in some cases citizens themselves. 
Let me try to make my point clearer.  My thesis is that 
disinformation techniques are a serious threat to the functioning of the 
marketplace of ideas and democratic deliberation, and therefore, it has 
fallen upon other institutions—especially the press and sometimes 
others—to fight them.  How?  They do so mainly by adhering to ethics of 
journalism: by refusing to print lies, malicious defamation, 
unsubstantiated rumors, and refusing to take direction from the 
government.  And this role shows how much a different function of the 
 
 4 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 23 
(2010). 
 5 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978).  
 6 From a competition perspective, the obvious holes in the First Amendment’s 
protection are not hard to see: they include an indifference to distortions introduced by 
powerful private parties, especially speech monopolists, and the restrictions on buyers 
as well as sellers.  I want to focus on the alternatives to censorship, namely 
disinformation campaigns.  
 7 See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547 (2018). 
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First Amendment really matters: namely its protection of the press and 
other platforms from government when they try to protect public 
deliberation from disinformation campaigns.  In other words, it is 
through the protection of editorial independence, or now the content 
moderation policies of major platforms, that the First Amendment plays 
its main role in fighting disinformation’s corruption of the marketplace 
of ideas. 
This First Amendment protection is sometimes called the 
protection of “editorial discretion,”8 but it deserves a better title.  And it 
seems that the protection for editorial discretion should not be some 
kind of free-floating right but one that depends on the degree to which 
it is used to cultivate a working marketplace of ideas, either by itself or 
as part of a broader ecosystem of contending thought. 
What then of platforms that seek to amplify disinformation or 
refuse to police it?  Here lies the true real weak spot in the American 
design: it is utterly dependent on actual independence of the press, or 
other major speech institutions, from government.  If that becomes 
eroded, if the entire press and major speech platforms are unified with 
government, then together they can do what they want: run 
disinformation campaigns and prevent disfavored speech from being 
heard by anyone.  That’s what makes the tradition of editorial 
independence so important, for it is really a protection against 
government’s power to terrorize the press. 
Some would accept the basic premise that the government can use 
disinformation campaigns as an alternative to censorship but get stuck 
at the point of wanting anyone to do anything about it.  The hesitation 
comes from some version of the idea that one man’s disinformation is 
another man’s sacred truth and that the cure is worse than the disease.  
In other words, unlike censorship, which everyone thinks they know 
when they see it, the feeling is that disinformation and propaganda are 
inherently subjective categories and forms of speech, so there is nothing 
to be done.9   
But this is a mistaken view, for disinformation is not such a vague 
thing, and doing nothing is also a choice.  Those who run disinformation 
campaigns know what they are doing.  The techniques are known.  They 
amount to bad-faith efforts to deliberately corrupt public deliberation 
on important questions by using lies, the inculcation of fear and chaos, 
dissemination of conspiracy theories, and bad-faith discrediting of 
experts.  It is a mistake, one fortified by academics, to suggest that 
 
 8 E.g., L.A. v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).  
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 
638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011).  
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anything persuasive can be seen as propaganda, making a hamburger 
advertisement a form of thought control.  We are speaking of techniques 
whose goal is to distort, corrupt, or even destroy deliberation and 
replace it with much cruder and uglier replacements.  
The techniques of disinformation can be understood as efforts to 
destroy the functioning of a marketplace of ideas.  One way is by 
preventing it from reaching any kind of resolution between contesting 
ideas.  I do not think what Holmes had in mind was never-ending 
combat; he envisioned a process that did its best to reach majoritarian 
answers, even if imperfect to the problems of the day.10  But 
disinformation techniques prevent the market process from reaching 
any kind of conclusion by denying facts and maintaining division.  At an 
extreme, the marketplace of ideas becomes a barren slugfest that exists 
for the spectacle itself and its identity-reinforcing capabilities, similar to 
how Orwell believed that a State might want continuous war for reasons 
unrelated to military victory.11  It can be taken as a sign of a healthy 
deliberative process if, at some point, the losing side accepts the loss and 
the adherents’ views become outliers.  In contrast, a country that cannot 
overcome divisions over long periods ceases to function as a single 
deliberative unit.   
What does this perspective offer for our times?  As the cliché goes, 
Abrams retains its relevance but in a way much different than usually 
understood.  Its genius lies in recognizing a competitive, deliberative 
process at the core of democratic government and majoritarian 
decision-making.  But to the extent that it was taken to suggest that 
banning censorship offers sufficient protection for that process, it was 
mistaken, even in its time.  Instead, as a practical matter and for most of 
history, it falls to intermediaries, the press and other institutions, to do 
the day-by-day work of protecting and promoting a marketplace of 
ideas.   
This lesson is of particular importance when we consider the major 
speech platforms of our time, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others, 
all of which once thought that editorial discretion might just be an 
artifact of another time.12  In fits and starts, at least some of them seem 
to have learned that with the promotion of speech comes responsibility, 
one that, unexercised, threatens the republic in which they were born.  
 
 10 “Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy 
based upon imperfect knowledge.”  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).  
 11 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 241 (1949).  
 12 See Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-
Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2008–10 (2019). 
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The protection of a healthy marketplace for ideas turns out to be harder 
than it looks. 
 
